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Abstract
This paper presents a measure of social discrimination based on
the principle of equality of opportunity. According to this principle we
only have to care about the inequality derived from people’s diﬀeren-
tial circumstances (and not about outcome diﬀerences due to people’s
d i v e r s ed e g r e eo fe ﬀort). We propose approaching the measurement of
group discrimination as the ”welfare loss” attributed to the inequality
between social groups of similar characteristics. We also provide an
empirical application to the analysis of gender discrimination in the
European labour market. We estimate wage equations to breakdown
wage gaps and to control for extra individual heterogeneity. Given
these predictions, we compute the index of welfare loss due to gender
discrimination.
JEL CODES: D63, J71










This paper deals with the measurement of unfairness in income distribu-
tion, focusing on the unequal treatment of social groups (what we call group
discrimination). This kind of analysis involves a mixture of positive and nor-
mative economics and has to take into account that agents may be widely
heterogeneous in some respects that are relevant for the explanation of out-
come diﬀerentials (age, education, experience, sector of occupation, labour
status, etc.). Disentangling group discrimination from the rewards of diﬀer-
ences in agents’ characteristics (the yields of diverse human capital levels,
say) becomes, therefore, a critical modelling choice. This analysis refers to
”income” but is actually applicable to the distribution of any unidimensional
variable that expresses the individuals’ achievements in a society.
We approach the measurement of group discrimination borrowing some
ideas from the ”equality of opportunity” literature [see Roemer (1993, 1998),
Peragine (2000, 2002), Ruiz-Castillo (2003), Villar (2005), Chechi & Per-
agine (2005)]. According to this approach, one can view income distribution
as the result of two diﬀerent eﬀects: eﬀort and opportunity.E ﬀort has to
do with responsibility and refers to the individuals’ autonomous decisions
(e.g. choice of occupation, investment in human capital, length and intensity
of work, healthy lifestyle, etc.). Opportunity refers to the agents’ external
circumstances for which they are not responsible (genes, race, gender, fam-
ily socioeconomic and cultural background, among others). The equality of
opportunity approach implies that a fair society should compensate agents
for diﬀerences in opportunity but not for those diﬀerences derived from au-
tonomous choices.1
We consider a model of a society with a ﬁnite number of agents who
can be heterogeneous in several respects, that can be classiﬁed as either
characteristics or circumstances. ”Characteristics” include those variables
related to the market rewards of human capital (e.g. education, experience).
They can be mostly understood as an expression of the agents’ personal
decisions, so they play a role similar to the eﬀort variables in the equality of
opportunity literature. By ”circumstances” we refer to those features that
1Note autonomous choices are always relative to the type of social structure under
consideration. The education level of an individual, for instance, may quite safely be
considered as an eﬀort variable in most contemporary western societies. In other societies,
however, may rather reﬂect the agents’ external circumstances (e.g. the family economic,








 cannot be considered responsibility of the agents (e.g. race, gender, family
background). We say that two agents belong to the same social group if they
have the same circumstances, no matter their characteristics. And we deﬁne
a category as a set of agents with the same characteristics, no matter their
circumstances. Discrimination refers to the diﬀerential outcomes of people
within the same category, that is, income diﬀerences that are not associated
with agents’ characteristics but rather with agents’ circumstances.
The ﬁrst part of the paper is devoted to presenting a measure of discrim-
ination that derives from a speciﬁc social evaluation function that embodies
the equality of opportunity principle and turns out to be additively decom-
posable. It corresponds to the aggregate welfare loss that derives from the
unequal treatment of social groups across the diﬀerent categories. Let us re-
call here that the idea of using an additively decomposable measure to allow
for a ﬁne assessment of segregation is not new. It appears, among others, in
the works of Theil & Finizza (1971), Fuchs (1975) and, much in the spirit of
this paper, in Mora & Ruiz Castillo (2003, 2005).
The second part of the paper focusses on gender as a primary instance
of people’s external circumstances (opportunity), whereas we shall consider
variables such as education and experience as the relevant characteristics.
Equality of opportunity would require, in this particular context, equalizing
the rewards of female and male workers with similar characteristics. We
analyze, within this set-up, gender discrimination in the European labour
market using data from the European Community Household Panel (1994-
2001). Moreover, we use Mincerian wage equations to breakdown wage gaps
in diﬀerences in returns and diﬀerences in individuals’ characteristics and/or
circumstances. Given these predictions for males and females, we study the
index of welfare loss due to gender discrimination treating employment and
n o ne m p l o y m e n ta saf e a t u r ed e ﬁning social groups. Germany, UK and Spain
move between 5% and 8% of welfare losses, relative to total welfare, due to
gender discrimination during the period, whereas Italy and France are clearly








 2T h e m o d e l
2.1 Preliminaries: inequality, social welfare, and equal-
ity of opportunity
Suppose, to start with, that we want to assess the welfare content of an
income distribution in a homogeneous population made of n individuals, by
means of a social evaluation function W : Rn
++ → R. A standard way of
performing this assessment is by using some notion of egalitarian equivalent
income. Following Sen (1973) we can deﬁne the egalitarian equivalent
income xe(x) as the income level such that W(x)=W(xe(x)1n), where 1n
is the n-vector all whose components are equal to one. That is, xe(x) is the
income level that, if enjoyed by all members of the society, would yield the
same social welfare that the actual income distribution. Assuming that the
social evaluation function is symmetric and quasi-concave (i.e. anonymous
and minimally egalitarian), xe(x) is always smaller than the actual per capita
income, µ(x). Therefore, we can deﬁne an inequality measure IW by simply
computing the diﬀerence between perfect equality and the ratio between




where IW depends, of course, on the social evaluation function we choose in
order to deﬁne the egalitarian equivalent income. We can interpret this index,
much in the spirit of the Lorenz curve, as a money metric that gives the share
of total welfare that is lost as a consequence of the unequal distribution.
The expression above allows one to interpret xe(x)=µ(x)[1− IW(x)] as
the "inequality-adjusted" mean income. Then, a social evaluation function
WI can be naturally deﬁn e d( f o rag i v e ni n e q u a l i t ym e a s u r eI) as follows:
WI(x)=nx
e(x)=X [1 − I(x)]
where X = nµ(x). is the aggregate income. That is, the welfare content of an
income distribution vector x is measured by the aggregate inequality-adjusted
income. Or, put diﬀerently, the welfare evaluation of an income distribution
discounts from the aggregate income a fraction XI(x) that corresponds to
the welfare loss due to inequality. Needless to say, our welfare assessment








 Suppose now that the population can be partitioned into k diﬀerent pop-
ulation subgroups, according to some demographic criterion. When the in-














This expression tells us that the welfare evaluation of distribution x is mea-
sured by the corresponding total income, deﬂated by two diﬀerent terms. The
ﬁrst one, X
Pk
j=1 ωj(.)IW(xj), describes the aggregate welfare loss that is due
to the inequality within the corresponding population subgroups. Here the
terms ωj(.) > 0 are the coeﬃcients that determine the relative weight of each




measures the welfare loss due to the inequality between population subgroups
(measured by the dispersion of the mean income of the groups weighted by
the corresponding population size).
Consider now a society consisting of N = {1,2,...,n} individuals that can
be classiﬁed into g =1 ,2,...,G social groups,w h e r eagroup describes the set
of agents with the same external circumstances. A category is a collection
of individuals with similar characteristics. There are C diﬀerent categories,
that are indexed by c. A cell describes a set of agents of the same group with
the same characteristics. That is, cell (c,g) is the set of agents of group g
w h ob e l o n gt oc a t e g o r yc. There are ncg agents in cell (c,g) whose income
vector is x(c,g). Category c, denoted by N(c), consists of those agents in N,
no matter their social groups, who have the same characteristics. There are
nc =
PG
g=1 ncg agents in category c with income x(c)=[ x(c,1), ..., x(c,G)],
for c =1 ,2,...,C. An Income Allocation is a point x ∈ ΠC
c=1R
nc
++.T h a t i s ,
xic describes the income of an agent i ∈ N(c). Let Xc =
P
i∈N(c) xic, for each
c =1 ,2,...,C.T h a ti s ,Xc is the total income corresponding to those agents
in category N(c).
We want to measure the welfare content of an income allocation from
the equality of opportunity viewpoint. This principle establishes that the
inequality between categories is not ethically relevant. When the evaluation
























That is, we discard that part of the observed inequality that is due to the
diﬀerences in agents’ characteristics.
2.2 A closed evaluation formula
Equation [2] allows for a number of alternative speciﬁcations, depending on
the additively decomposable inequality index we choose. Let us consider now
some standard requirements that will lead to a closed evaluation formula.
Our ﬁrst requirement is that the coeﬃcients that determine the weight of
the population subgroups in the within term of the decomposition in equation
[1] add up to one; that is,
PC
c=1 ωc(.)=1 . When this is the case, we have
an exact decomposition of the inequality index and the interpretation of [1]
is much simpler and intuitive, because the within groups component is just
a weighted average of the inequality of the diﬀerent categories. Moreover,
the between groups component is not independent of those weights when PC
c=1 ωc(.) 6=1(Cf. Theil (1967, p. 125)).
Deﬁne now a regular inequality index as one that satisﬁes the following
basic properties: symmetry (permuting incomes does not change the value
of the index), population replication (replicating a given population does
not change the value of the index), Dalton’s principle of transfers (a small
transfer from a rich to a poor reduces inequality), and zero homogeneity
(I(λx)=I(x) for all λ>0). We know from Shorrocks (1980) that any regular
and smooth (diﬀerentiable) inequality index that is additively decomposable
is a member of the generalized entropy family Iθ. Moreover, if we require
an exact decomposition of the within groups term we are left with just two
members of the family: the ﬁrst index of Theil, T, that corresponds to the
value θ =1in the entropy family, and the second index of Theil, T∗, that
corresponds to θ =0 .
So, if we construct a social evaluation function out of a regular inequality
index and require this index to satisfy additive decomposability plus exact
decomposition, our evaluation formula is reduced to just two possibilities:








 between those two indices is that the role of population and income shares
is reversed. In the decomposition corresponding to the ﬁrst index of Theil
the coeﬃcients ωc(.) correspond to income shares whereas in the case of the
second index they correspond to population shares.
Let fic(x)=
∂W(x)
∂xic be the marginal social value of agent i in category c
with income xic. We say that the evaluation function W satisﬁes the property
of minimal equity (Sen (1973), Villar (2005)) when xic >x hc implies fic(x) <
fhc(x), for each given category c. That is, it is satisﬁed when we give more
weight in social welfare to those agents with smaller incomes, within each
category. It is easy to see that the ﬁrst index of Theil satisﬁes this property
whereas the second one does not.
We can therefore summarize the above discussion as follows:
Theorem 1 Let WI : R++ → R be a Social Evaluation Function obtained
o u to far e g u l a ra n ds m o o t hi n e q u a l i t yi n d e x . WI satisﬁes minimal equity
and exact additive decomposability if and only if, for all x ∈ Rn
++,
WI(x)=X [1 − T(x)] [3]
where T(x) is Theil’s ﬁrst index of inequality.2
It is easy to see that the associated equality of opportunity welfare mea-




Xc [1 − T(x(c))] [2
0]
Therefore, we are measuring the welfare content of an income allocation x
as the aggregate income of all groups, each of which is deﬂated by inequality,
measured by the Theil’s ﬁrst inequality index. Each term XcT(x(c)) gives us
the aggregate welfare loss that is due to the unequal distribution of income
in category c. See Villar (2005) for an alternative characterization of this
formula.











. This index can be interpreted as a measure of the distance be-








 2.3 Discrimination as a social welfare loss
Let us consider the measurement of inequality of opportunity and group
discrimination that derive from the evaluation formula [20]. We ﬁrst determine
the welfare loss due to the inequality of opportunity (the size of unequal
distribution across categories), and then deﬁne a simple discrimination index.
To do that we apply once more the decomposability properties of the social
evaluation function.
Let each term Xc [1 − T [x(c)]] in equation [20] be considered as the wel-
fare measure of income allocation x(c) for the category N(c), considered as
an independent society, c =1 ,2,...,C. Recurring once more to the decompos-
ability property of the index, taking the constituent groups as the relevant
partition, we can write:
Xc [1 − T [x(c)]] =
G X
g=1
Xcg[1 − T(x(c,g))] − Q[x(c)] [4]
where x(c,g) i st h ei n c o m ev e c t o ro ft h e(c,g) cell, Xcg its aggregate income,







is the between cells inequality in category c. This expression gives us an
overall measure of the welfare loss due to the inequality of opportunity,
attributed to category c, as a weighted sum of the relative means (in logs)
of the diﬀerent groups. Note that Qc(x) ≥ 0, with Qc(x)=0if and only if
µ(c,g)=µ(c) for all g.















This equation tells us that the total welfare associated with the allocation
x can be understood as the sum of the welfare of all cells that compose the

















 which gives us the aggregate welfare loss due to inequality of opportunity.
This welfare loss consists of a weighted sum of the mean deviations of the
cells with respect to their corresponding categories, where the weights are
given by the corresponding aggregate incomes. Note that ln
µ(c,g)
µ(c) will be
negative when µ(c,g) <µ (c) and positive otherwise. Therefore, those cells
with mean income above that of their category reduce total welfare whereas
those cells with mean income below their category increase it.
It is worth stressing that Q is a remarkably simple and intuitive mea-
surement function which does not require much information to be computed
(in particular it does not require information about the entire distribution!).
For a given income allocation x ∈ Rn
++,Q (x) tells us the total income that
society is losing as a consequence of the inequality of opportunity. Function
Q is a money metric and, therefore, our welfare assessment will depend on
the units in which income is measured.






That is, L(x) tells us the percentage of total welfare that is lost due to
discrimination.
Computing this measure requires a precise knowledge of the whole income
distribution vector. This might be hard to obtain in some empirical applica-
tions. Note, however, that this complication would vanish if all agents within
a given cell had the same income (something that will have to be assumed
in many empirical applications). Indeed, if xic = µ(c,g) for all i ∈ N(c), we
have T(x(c,g)) = 0 and, therefore, the formulae above become, respectively:







These formulae are reasonable approximations to the measurement of
total welfare and the relative welfare loss due to the inequality of opportunity,
that do not require information on the whole income distribution vector.
Needless to say the accuracy of this approximation depends on the size of








 Remark The measure of welfare loss due to inequality of opportunity is
an aggregate measure of the eﬀects of discrimination on social welfare. Note
that it is the sum of positive and negative entries, depending on the relative
means of the cells, so that it has the nature of a net global index.
3 An application: Gender discrimination in
the European labour market
3.1 Gender discrimination in the labour market
Let us now consider the case of gender discrimination in the labour market as
a specially relevant instance of group discrimination. We aim at evaluating
the welfare content of the labour income distribution by taking women and
men as the reference social groups and applying the decomposability proper-
ties presented above. In this way we generate a measure of gender discrim-
ination that corresponds to the welfare loss associated with the inequality
between women and men, aggregated across categories. Gender discrimina-
tion is captured by the sum of the unexplained income dispersion between
those categories of female and male workers with similar characteristics.
The measurement of gender discrimination by means of this formula
amounts to assuming that a labour income allocation is fair whenever all peo-
ple within the same category receive the same income. And, consequently,
those diﬀerences due to diverse characteristics are not to be considered gen-
der discrimination at the labour market.3 Therefore, choosing the variables
that deﬁne social groups and categories amounts to determine the kind of
discrimination we capture and the kind of income dispersion we disregard. A
point in case is that concerning employed and non-employed working age pop-
u l a t i o n ,w h e r ew ec a l lnon-employed the union of unemployed and inactive.
Using employed and non-employed workers as characteristics implies can-
celling the inequality due to the diﬀerences in participation between women
and men (as we would be attributing that inequality to diﬀerences between
employed and non-employed, and not between female and male workers).
If, on the contrary, we think of employed and non-employed as deﬁning the
social groups, the welfare loss will capture simultaneously the diﬀerences in
3It would be much more accurate saying that this is not part of income discrimination.








 salaries, unemployment, and participation rates. We favour here the last
approach because we understand that non-employment diﬀerentials between
women and men derive more from economic and social restrictions than from
free choices.
3.2 Data and results
We apply here this way of modelling gender discrimination to the analysis
of the labour market in ﬁve European countries with comparable datasets:
Germany (de), Spain (es), France (fr), the United Kingdom (uk)a n dI t a l y
(it). The time span considered is 1994-2001. Nevertheless, the data of Ger-
many present a "hole" in 1998 and the one for the UK are only available
for 1994-1997. The data source comes from two diﬀerent datasets. Data on
population and employment status comes from the EU Labour Force Survey,
oﬀered by Eurostat. Data on wages are obtained from the European Commu-
nity Household Panel (hereafter ‘ECHP’). We have measured average hourly
wages for each worker by using individual data coming from the ECHP eight
available waves, 1994 to 2001.
In this application we consider four social groups: women and men, em-
ployed or not.4 Individual categories are deﬁned by two variables. The ﬁrst
one is education that simply generates two categories: "low" educated work-
ers (meaning those with the mandatory level of education in each country)
and "high" educated workers (those with more than the mandatory educa-
tion). The second one is age, considered as a proxy of experience; here we
consider three diﬀerent categories: young, medium, and old workers. We
have therefore six categories and four social groups within each category in
this exercise.
We compute the index of welfare loss due to gender discrimination for
each cell by using equation (6). Moreover, we get a unit-free measure by
considering the welfare loss per unit of welfare, due to gender discrimination.
Hence, we compute the index ˆ L(x) in equation (70).
Those individuals who are not employed, that is who are unemployed or
inactive, enter the data with a notional income that is computed accord-
ing to each country’s speciﬁc institutional deﬁnition. More precisely, for
4That is, we do not treat non-employment as a personal choice but rather as part of
the agents’ "circumstances". The data we obtain are to be interpreted, consequently, as








 u n e m p l o y e dp e o p l ew ec o m p u t et h e i ri ncome by using each country’s Un-
employment Beneﬁts system, controlling for the duration in unemployment
in each cell (as Unemployment Beneﬁts in all countries analyzed depend on
such duration). And we impute an income equal to the mean Social Protec-
tion Beneﬁts, measured by the OECD, for those who are not in the labor
force.5 Note that in this way we reduce the inequality between employed and
non-employed due to inactive people.
Figure 1 summarizes the ﬁrst result of this analysis. It depicts the index of
welfare loss due to gender discrimination based on the observed diﬀerences in
hourly wages. Germany, UK and Spain experience a relative welfare loss that
oscillates between 5% and 8% during the period. Italy and France are clearly
below that level (somewhere between 3% and 5%). It is quite noticeable the
idiosyncratic nature of the corresponding time paths.
But the analysis in that ﬁgura is still quite preliminary as there is much
more heterogeneity among women and men than that captured in that clas-
siﬁcation of workers’ social groups and categories. Think of aspects such as
tenure on the job, occupation type, economic sector, size of the ﬁrm, etc.
All of them are widely recognized as important determinants of wage dif-
ferentials. One way of incorporating this additional heterogeneity into the
model is to supplement the analysis developed above with some econometric
estimations. One can also think of deﬁning a ﬁner partition of social groups
and characteristics. Yet some of those aspects that explain wage diﬀerentials
are diﬃcult to attribute to one or another dimension. That is where the
econometrics plays a role allowing us to control for that heterogeneity.
Hence, we specify wage equations following the traditional Mincerian ap-
proach (Mincer, 1974). The observations on the dependent variable, hourly
wages, will be classiﬁed into two regimes that are generated by diﬀerent
probability laws with the following mean, in log terms:
lnWj = Xjβj + uj with j = man, woman
where Wj represents observed hourly wages for a men or women, Xj is the
set of observable determinants of wages and uj represents the unobservable
component of wages, which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean
zero and variance σj. We will consider in Xj all relevant observed diﬀerences
between men and women, regardless they could be considered as charac-
5These beneﬁts are measured in annual terms. Hence we use the annual mean hours in








 teristics or as circumstances. In Tables 1-5 we can see the results for the
estimations for each of the ﬁve studied countries.6 The variables considered
in those equations are tenure in the job, occupation category in that job, some
characteristics of the ﬁrm (size, sector of activity, region, public ownership),
marital status of the worker, number of children and some characteristics of
the spouse (labour status and his/her educational level).
Hence, we estimate a diﬀerent equation for each gender in each labour
category and use it to breakdown predicted wage gaps into diﬀerences in
returns and diﬀerences in individuals’ characteristics and/or circumstances
(See Oaxaca, 1973). As it is well known, the former diﬀerence, the one in
returns, is what is known as diﬀerences due to discrimination in the labour
market. Moreover, we can decompose predicted wages in two diﬀerent ways,
basically depending on the counterfactual prediction we use:
ˆ wM − ˆ wF =¯ xMˆ βM − ¯ xFˆ βF =¯ xM
³
ˆ βM − ˆ βF
´
+ ˆ βF (¯ xM − ¯ xF)
=¯ xF
³
ˆ βM − ˆ βF
´
+ ˆ βM (¯ xM − ¯ xF)
In the ﬁrst case, we are using a counterfactual prediction for females (the
wage they had earned in case their characteristics/circumstances were the
ones of males) and in the second case the counterfactual prediction is built for
males (the wage they had earned in case their characteristics/circumstances
were paid using the coeﬃcients estimated for females). As we can see in
Figures 3 and 4, the decomposition using women’s counterfactuals can be
considered as a maximum limit of the welfare loss index whereas the one
which uses men counterfactuals represent a minimum level for such index.
The reason is that women’s counterfactual is lower than the one for men.
F i n a l l y ,b e f o r eg o i n gt ot h er e s u l t s ,w eh a v et os a yt h a t ,a si ti su s u a l ,
we could control for selection into employment, in our wage equations. It is
obvious that men and women employed are not a random sample of men and
women in the labour market. The usual way of controlling this self-selection
problem is considering Heckman (1979) corrections in the wage equations.
We do not want to control for this, however, as we consider that employment
6As we are considering six labour categories for this application, we are in fact estimat-
ing six equations for each country. For the sake of space we are showing in these tables
only the results for the total sample in each gender in each country. The results for each
labour group are highly similar in the estimated coeﬃcients with those shown in the table








 is an economic trait determining two diﬀerent social groups. In this sense,
we want to compare wages for employed men and women, without such a
correction (otherwise we would lose a crucial source of discrimination we are
interested in).
Hence, going directly to our results, Figure 2 presents the results for the
welfare loss index based on these econometric approach, that is, based on
predicted wages instead of observed wages as they are in Figure 1. As we
can see comparing both ﬁgures, the welfare loss index based on predicted
wages is almost equal to the one based on observed wages. However, we
have that the one based on predicted wages is a bit smaller for Germany
and the UK whereas it is larger for Italy and France than the one based on
observed wages. Figures 5 to 11 summarize our main ﬁndings. They show
the comparative evolution of this index for the ﬁve selected countries both for
the whole economy and for the diﬀerent groups deﬁned by their employment
status, education, and age.
Figures 5 and 6 describe the welfare loss due to gender discrimination by
education levels. Two features are worth stressing. First, that we ﬁnd also
here very diﬀerent national patterns. Second, that gender discrimination is
relatively higher within highly educated workers only for Spain and Italy:
they account for more than 50 % of total discrimination in both countries
and during all the years considered. On the contrary, France and specially
Germany and the UK show more welfare losses due to gender discrimination
for low educated workers.
Figures 7 to 9 present the results for the age groups. The diversity of
patterns between countries is also a relevant feature. The strongest discrim-
ination occurs within the old workers group, with some diﬀerences. Spain is
the country where welfare loss due to gender discrimination is mainly based
on the discrimination among old workers (almost 60% of the total index).
Finally, Figure 10 shows the results for employed people and Figure 11 the
ones for non-employed. The levels of welfare loss due to gender discrimination
among non-employed workers decrease substantially, showing the relevance
of computing or not non-employment discrimination. The countries’ indexes
move between 0.02 and 0.06 of welfare loss given by gender discrimination
among employed workers. It is worth stressing that the behavior of the four
countries is quite diverse along the years. The discrimination for employed
workers is more important although it shows a more stable pattern, with
Spain showing an increasing trend which is totally oﬀset by the highly de-
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 TABLE 1: Regression Results for Spain (EHCP, Full sample, 1994-2001)
   MALES FEMALES 
   Coef.  Std. Dev.  T Statistic  Coef.  Std. Dev.  T Statistic 
Unskilled -0,1707 0,0062 -27,71 -0,2186  0,0099 -22,13
Tenure   0,0299 0,0015 20,22 0,0447  0,0021 21,16
Tenure (sq)  -0,0009 0,0001 -12,48 -0,0016  0,0001 -15,81
High. Ocup.  0,5830 0,0164 35,62 0,5881  0,0361 16,31
Med-High Ocup.  0,2438 0,0093 26,3 0,2679  0,0125 21,49
Medium Ocup.  0,1548 0,0120 12,86 0,1308  0,0138 9,46
Med-Low Ocup.  0,0426 0,0078 5,48 0,0597  0,0132 4,52
Married 0,1779 0,0110 16,24 0,1013  0,0183 5,54
No. Children  0,0262 0,0030 8,88 0,0089  0,0047 1,87
Age   0,0370 0,0018 21,01 0,0469  0,0028 16,56
Age (sq.)  -0,0003 0,0000 -16,59 -0,0005  0,0000 -14,05
Public Sector  0,1542 0,0069 22,25 0,2712  0,0093 29,3
Spouse Prim. Edu.  -0,1965 0,0090 -21,76 -0,1813  0,0121 -15
Spouse Second. Edu.  -0,0754 0,0100 -7,56 -0,0788  0,0133 -5,9
Agriculture -0,1731 0,0128 -13,57 -0,0357  0,0277 -1,29
Industry 0,1065 0,0061 17,5 0,0307  0,0111 2,77
Spouse employed  -0,0347 0,0067 -5,15 0,0198  0,0148 1,33
Overskilled -0,0209 0,0052 -4,02 -0,0307  0,0077 -3,96
Medium-size firm  0,0887 0,0063 14,08 0,1621  0,0092 17,62
Big Firm  0,1936 0,0063 30,68 0,1646  0,0094 17,49
Constant Term  5,9999 0,0342 175,49 5,5559  0,0538 103,31
               
Number Observations    21464      10975  









 TABLE 2: Regression Results for France (EHCP, Full sample, 1994-2001)
   MALES FEMALES 
   Coef.  Std. Dev.  T Statistic  Coef.  Std. Dev.  T Statistic 
Unskilled -0,1515 0,0070 -21,76 -0,2032  0,0088 -23,21
Tenure   0,0244 0,0018 13,85 0,0358  0,0021 16,93
Tenure (sq)  -0,0007 0,0001 -8,28 -0,0009  0,0001 -9,19
High. Ocup.  0,5365 0,0171 31,36 0,5045  0,0245 20,6
Med-High Ocup.  0,3083 0,0129 23,86 0,3153  0,0136 23,1
Medium Ocup.  0,1277 0,0154 8,27 0,1995  0,0139 14,32
Med-Low Ocup.  0,0715 0,0127 5,64 0,0909  0,0160 5,69
Married 0,2552 0,0120 21,22 0,1460  0,0178 8,19
No. Children  -0,0018 0,0029 -0,64 -0,0198  0,0042 -4,73
Age   0,0516 0,0026 19,69 0,0480  0,0034 14,16
Age (sq.)  -0,0005 0,0000 -15,89 -0,0005  0,0000 -12,28
Public Sector  0,1334 0,0077 17,25 0,1529  0,0083 18,36
Spouse Prim. Edu.  -0,1915 0,0098 -19,49 -0,2036  0,0119 -17,14
Spouse Second. Edu.  -0,1436 0,0097 -14,82 -0,1804  0,0114 -15,84
Agriculture -0,1476 0,0243 -6,08 -0,0811  0,0418 -1,94
Industry 0,1119 0,0070 16,07 0,0879  0,0106 8,29
Spouse employed  -0,0432 0,0075 -5,73 -0,0045  0,0140 -0,32
Overskilled 0,0165 0,0059 2,81 -0,0233  0,0071 -3,29
Medium-size firm  0,0022 0,0104 0,21 0,0206  0,0133 1,55
Big Firm  0,0882 0,0092 9,54 0,0619  0,0127 4,86
Constant Term  2,7436 0,0497 55,22 2,8652  0,0621 46,13
               
Number Observations    17656      13268  









 TABLE 3: Regression Results for Germany (EHCP, Full sample,
1994-1997 & 1999-2001)
   MALES FEMALES 
   Coef.  Std. Dev.  T Statistic  Coef.  Std. Dev.  T Statistic 
Unskilled -0,1818 0,0067 -27,28 -0,1830  0,0083 -22,1
Tenure   0,0010 0,0004 2,61 0,0071  0,0005 13,99
Tenure (sq)  0,0000 0,0000 1,8 0,0000  0,0000 12,9
High. Ocup.  0,3643 0,0141 25,81 0,3359  0,0241 13,91
Med-High Ocup.  0,2631 0,0106 24,88 0,2368  0,0132 17,87
Medium Ocup.  0,1748 0,0132 13,28 0,2259  0,0142 15,96
Med-Low Ocup.  0,0667 0,0102 6,55 0,0452  0,0142 3,18
Married 0,1640 0,0112 14,66 0,0528  0,0155 3,4
No. Children  -0,0072 0,0027 -2,7 -0,0430  0,0039 -10,99
Age   0,1101 0,0017 64,4 0,1222  0,0023 52,09
Age (sq.)  -0,0012 0,0000 -58,14 -0,0014  0,0000 -47,33
Public Sector  0,0904 0,0067 13,48 0,1963  0,0070 27,95
Spouse Prim. Edu.  -0,0660 0,0095 -6,95 -0,0409  0,0128 -3,2
Spouse Second. Edu.  -0,0625 0,0077 -8,11 -0,0757  0,0082 -9,19
Agriculture -0,1338 0,0189 -7,06 -0,1764  0,0272 -6,48
Industry 0,1128 0,0058 19,42 0,0839  0,0083 10,12
Spouse employed  -0,0668 0,0060 -11,16 -0,0371  0,0114 -3,26
Medium-size firm  0,0924 0,0059 15,56 0,1071  0,0073 14,76
Big Firm  0,2027 0,0065 31,04 0,2192  0,0088 24,8
Constant Term  0,6554 0,0353 18,55 0,2862  0,0458 6,25
               
Number Observations    29043      19839  









 TABLE 4: Regression Results for Italy (EHCP, Full sample, 1994-2001)
   MALES FEMALES 
   Coef.  Std. Dev.  T Statistic  Coef.  Std. Dev.  T Statistic 
               
Unskilled -0,0914 0,0050 -18,21 -0,1392  0,0076 -18,31
Tenure   0,0161 0,0013 12,5 0,0138  0,0017 8,3
Tenure (sq)  -0,0005 0,0001 -8,34 -0,0004  0,0001 -5,41
High. Ocup.  0,5525 0,0137 40,32 0,4344  0,0383 11,36
Med-High Ocup.  0,1963 0,0078 25,04 0,2485  0,0108 23,08
Medium Ocup.  0,1208 0,0082 14,78 0,1198  0,0106 11,32
Med-Low Ocup.  0,0391 0,0068 5,75 0,0367  0,0105 3,49
Married 0,2180 0,0114 19,13 0,1182  0,0160 7,41
No. Children  0,0285 0,0026 10,82 0,0017  0,0037 0,47
Age   0,0257 0,0016 15,96 0,0236  0,0023 10,29
Age (sq.)  -0,0002 0,0000 -12,18 -0,0002  0,0000 -6,51
Public Sector  0,0932 0,0053 17,6 0,1731  0,0072 24,11
Spouse Prim. Edu.  -0,2161 0,0096 -22,52 -0,1783  0,0109 -16,34
Spouse Second. Edu.  -0,1259 0,0090 -13,98 -0,1169  0,0102 -11,43
Agriculture -0,1250 0,0109 -11,48 -0,2162  0,0184 -11,77
Industry 0,0028 0,0052 0,54 0,0133  0,0081 1,64
Spouse employed  -0,0433 0,0053 -8,19 0,0482  0,0109 4,44
Overskilled -0,0027 0,0042 -0,65 0,0040  0,0056 0,72
Medium-size firm  0,0654 0,0052 12,48 0,0839  0,0069 12,1
Big Firm  0,0959 0,0052 18,37 0,0790  0,0077 10,28
Constant Term  2,0025 0,0320 62,65 1,9139  0,0435 43,99
               
Number Observations    21222      12708  









 TABLE 5: Regression Results for the U.K. (EHCP, Full sample,
1994-1997)
   MALES FEMALES 
   Coef.  Std. Dev.  T Statistic  Coef.  Std. Dev.  T Statistic 
               
Unskilled -0,1604 0,0068 -23,63 -0,1796  0,0073 -24,45
Tenure   0,0312 0,0018 17,63 0,0281  0,0020 14,34
Tenure (sq)  -0,0013 0,0001 -14,45 -0,0011  0,0001 -11,33
High. Ocup.  0,4985 0,0140 35,72 0,4730  0,0170 27,85
Med-High Ocup.  0,3928 0,0131 29,88 0,2927  0,0143 20,46
Medium Ocup.  0,1568 0,0148 10,63 0,2341  0,0144 16,3
Med-Low Ocup.  0,1248 0,0126 9,91 0,0366  0,0158 2,31
Married 0,1788 0,0124 14,39 0,0940  0,0168 5,58
No. Children  -0,0087 0,0033 -2,62 -0,0671  0,0038 -17,56
Age   0,0777 0,0020 39,24 0,0845  0,0023 36,69
Age (sq.)  -0,0009 0,0000 -36,59 -0,0010  0,0000 -35,5
Public Sector  0,0883 0,0082 10,71 0,2060  0,0076 26,97
Spouse Prim. Edu.  -0,1058 0,0088 -12,02 -0,1521  0,0092 -16,44
Spouse Second. Edu.  -0,0542 0,0101 -5,35 -0,0923  0,0109 -8,49
Agriculture -0,1679 0,0286 -5,87 -0,1908  0,0570 -3,35
Industry 0,0827 0,0068 12,16 0,1232  0,0098 12,57
Spouse employed  -0,0529 0,0086 -6,18 -0,0255  0,0140 -1,82
Medium-size firm  0,0672 0,0081 8,27 0,0715  0,0086 8,32
Big Firm  0,1885 0,0070 26,88 0,1833  0,0076 24,08
Constant Term  0,1933 0,0388 4,99 0,1062  0,0433 2,45
               
Number Observations    19333      16519  
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Figure 5: Index for Skilled workers (using as counterfactual the returns to
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Figure 6: Index for Unskilled workers (using as counterfactual the returns






































































































































































Figure 7: The welfare loss due to gender discrimination within the young




























Figure 8: The welfare loss due to gender discrimination within the medium
































 Figure 9: The welfare loss due to gender discrimination within the old





































Figure 10: Welfare loss due to gender discrimination in the employed
























Figure 11: Welfare loss due to gender discrimination in the non-employed
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